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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

Renee Spall-Goldsmith
Petitioner/Appellee,

Appellate Case No. 20110628

vs.

District Court Case No. 084300172

WILLARD LEROY GOLDSMITH

Trial Judge: Stephen L. Henriod
[Judge's Decisions Appealed from:

Respondent/Appellant

Honorable Robert Adkins]

Appeal from the Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
Bifurcated Decree of Divorce entered June 20, 2009 by the Honorable Robert
Adkins

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Attorney for Respondent/Appellant

Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee

Vernon Jolley
9710 S 700 E, Suite 111
Sandy, UT 84070
(801) 495-1442

Olivia D. Uitto (10649^
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ELLATE COURTS
Salt Lake City, UT 84171 p£g 2 4 2012
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction in the Utah Court of Appeals is proper under Utah Code Ann.
78A-4-103(2)(h) given that the appeal is from a final judgment from the District
Court of Utah before the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod. Judge Henriod's ruling
was read onto the record. After Judge Henriod's retirement, the parties brought a
dispute before the Honorable Judge Robert Adkins for interpretation. Appellant
appeals Judge Adkins interpretation.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78B-12-102(14) states: "Joint physical custody means
the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year and both
parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee contends that the trial court was correct in basing child support on
the sole custody worksheet because the parties do not meet both elements within
the definition of joint physical custody. Appellant contends that because he meets
one element of the definition, child support should be based upon joint physical
custody worksheet.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
After a one day trial before the Honorable Stephen L. Henroid on July 8,
2010, the court awarded sole physical custody to the Appellee, and granted
4
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extended parent time to the Appellant. The Court further ordered that there would
be no obligation for the Appellant to pay for any expenses of the minor child
beyond child support, excluding work related child care and medical expenses.
Furthermore, the Court ordered Appellant to receive a credit for any previously
paid extracurricular activities towards his child support obligation. Appellant's
attorney was order to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the
Decree of Divorce. Judge Henriod retired before the dispute over which child
support worksheet should be used, and therefore, Judge Adkins ruled after
considering the arguments of counsel to base the child support on the sole physical
worksheet. Appellant appeals this ruling.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The definition of joint physical custody is based upon two elements: the
number of overnights with each parent, and how the parents share the expenses of
the child beyond the ordered child support amount. Appellant meets the first part
of the definition, however, the second element was directly argued and ruled upon
at trial It was ordered that Appellant did not have to pay for expenses beyond child
support. In fact, Appellant would receive a credit towards child support for any
extracurricular activities he paid for. This ruling is in direct conflict with the
second element of the definition. Given the trial court's ruling in regards to the
payment of extracurricular activities, Appellant can't meet the second element of
5
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the definition and therefore the parties do not have a joint physical custody
arrangement. The trial court's ruling should be affirmed and the child support
should be based upon the sole physical worksheet.
ARGUMENT
The trial court was correct and within its power to deviate from the joint
physical custody worksheet given that the Court did not order the Appellant to
contribute to the expenses of the child beyond the normal child support obligation.
Appellant erroneously relies upon only half of the definition of joint physical
custody, and ignores the second part of the definition. Also, the Court was clear in
its ruling that the second part of the definition, the payment of additional expenses,
was not to be ordered. Therefore, the Court was clear that joint physical custody
was not ordered by the Court and therefore, the joint physical custody worksheet
should not be used in calculating child support.
Appellant correctly relies upon Utah Code Annotated Sec. 78B-12-102(14),
however, Appellant only focus on the first part of the definition. The legislature
has defined joint physical custody to depend upon two elements:
1. the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year,
and
2. both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying
child support.
6
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Utah Code Ann. 786-12-102(14). There is no dispute that the first element is
satisfied based upon the parent time schedule ordered by Judge Henriod. However,
the legislature is clear in that two requirements must be met in order for a custody
arrangement to be deemed joint physical custody, and therefore proper use of the
joint physical custody worksheet can be used. In the present case, Appellant
cannot satisfy the second element.
Clearly in his ruling, Judge Henriod excuses the Appellant from paying any
expenses of the child beyond his child support obligation. "Any past payments for
things like football or golf that Respondent may have paid may be counted towards
child support." R178-185, at Paragraph 21; see also Appellant's Addendum 3:
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 21. In addition, the Court
also stated "Football and golf are wonderful activities and are in the best-interests
of the child. Neither parent is ordered to pay for those activity [sic]. Good parents
will share these expenses. But there is no court Order to pay these expenses."
R178-185, paragraph 7; see also Appellant's Addendum 3: Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, paragraph 7, page 2. Given that the minor child's
extracurricular activities and the payment of these expenses was an issue in the
trial court and the judge specifically dealt with these expenses in the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, this ruling is also indicative of how the parties are to
pay for expenses of the child. The Court was clear: outside of child support, there
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 7
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is no order that Appellant needs to pay these expenses, and furthermore, any of
these expenses Appellant paid above and beyond child support, he shall receive a
credit or an offset.
Furthermore, besides child support, the legislature has stated that only two
other expenses are parents ordered to pay: work related child care expenses and
medical expenses. This Court has stated that "[t]his convinces us that had the
legislature intended that parents be ordered to pay additional categories of
expenses, such as school fees or extracurricular activities, in excess of child
support, it would have enacted legislation to that effect. Thus, child-rearing
expenses not statutorily distinguished from regular child support should be
considered "part and parcel of the child support award." See Brooks, 881 P.2d at
959 n.3., Davis v. Davis, 2011 UT App 311, f 17. Therefore, in the present case,
the child support award is to incorporate extracurricular activities, and therefore,
the Appellant is considered to have paid for these activities with his child support
payments. He does not pay of expenses of the child beyond child support, and
therefore cannot meet the definition of joint physical custody. Had the Court
ordered that Appellant was to share in the extracurricular activities expenses, or
had Appellant's reimbursement for these activities been denied, then Appellant
could meet both elements of the definition. However, given the Court's orders, the
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Appellant cannot meet the definition and therefore, use of the sole physical custody
child support worksheet would be appropriate and in line with the Court's ruling.
CONCLUSION
Appellant does not meet the definition of joint physical custody and
therefore, the sole physical custody worksheet should be used to calculate child
support. The trial court's ruling should be affirmed.

Dated: February 23, 2012

Respectfully submitted

By:
)livia Uitto, Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee
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